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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis was due to both incomplete regulation and ineffective supervision 
(Barth et al., 2013; U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). An increasing number of 
papers have analyzed the impact of regulation on bank behavior, focusing on various issues, such 
as lending (Lepetitet al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2013; Jiang Li and Shao, 2010), risk-taking (Harris 
and Raviv, 2014), economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Berger and Hannan, 1998; 
Kroszner and Strahan, 1996) and developing financial sectors across the globe (Beck et al. 2000; 
Barth et al., 2004). 
Surprisingly, less emphasis has been placed on supervision than on regulation, with only 
a handful of papers empirically assessing the effects of supervision on bank behavior. This is 
mainly due to a lack of data: most supervisory actions (such as recommendations, requests for 
capital add-ons, reports from on-site inspections, off-site analysis, etc.) are not ultimately 
enforced and thus usually remain confidential. As such, the few papers available on the subject 
(Delis et al., 2017; Delis and Staikouras, 2011; Danisewicz et al., 2017) focus on supervisory 
enforcement actions (i.e., publicly disclosed actions) in empirically investigating the 
effectiveness of supervision. Delis et al. (2017) examine the impact of formal enforcement 
actions on the safety and soundness of sanctioned banks in terms of bank capital, risk, and 
performance. Delis and Staikouras (2011) analyze the role of bank supervision in controlling 
bank risk among sanctioned banks, finding that the relationship between sanctions and risk is 
linear and negative. Denisewicz et al. (2017) examine the relationship between enforcement 
action with respect to single-market banks and contractions of bank lending and liquidity 
creation. In the research papers examined, the effectiveness of enforcement action (also labeled 
“sanctions” in this paper) is measured only in terms of behavioral changes (lending activity, risk-
taking, capitalization) of sanctioned banks. In reality, sanctions have two complementary goals: 
first, to penalize the guilty banks; second, to provide an example to other banks that bad behavior 
will be penalized. All existing papers have analyzed the consequence of sanctions, but none have 
investigated the cross-effects on non-sanctioned banks.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing whether sanctions increase bank 
stability and, more importantly, whether enforcement actions against competitors influence the 
risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks. Therefore, the main purpose of our paper is not to estimate 
the (endogenous and perhaps obvious) consequences of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks 
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but the consequences on other banks that share common risk features. Specifically, we posit that 
a non-sanctioned bank cares about enforcement actions taken against other similar banks. 
This point is crucial for regulatory and supervisory authorities, which must take into 
account the effects of enforcement actions on all banks in the system before issuing and publicly 
disclosing them. A central issue linked to spillover effects on unsanctioned banks, in fact, 
concerns the publication of sanctions on the Supervisory Authority website. In the U.S., 
enforcement actions for violations of laws, rules or regulations are published on the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency website in useful Excel files; thus, some papers have focused on the 
U.S. banking system (Delis et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the situation in the European banking 
system is more variegated: only a few National Central Banks (NCBs) publish enforcement 
actions (see Delis and Staikouras, 2011), while most prefer that supervisory measures remain 
confidential. Since November 2014, European banking supervision has undergone an epochal 
change, with the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for significant banks. To 
date, no studies of the spillover effects of the publication of enforcement actions against 
unsanctioned banks within the European banking system have appeared. 
We obtain two major results. First, credit risk-related sanctions lead sanctioned banks, in 
the year following the imposition of sanctions, to retire problematic loans, reduce their lending 
orientation, reduce their Tier 1 capital and increase their Tier 2 capital. Second, non-sanctioned 
banks tend to modify their risk-taking in response. Interestingly, we provide empirical evidence 
that non-sanctioned banks behave more similarly to sanctioned banks, the more similar they are 
to the sanctioned banks. This is an important result, as it shows that enforcement actions 
influence not only the stability of sanctioned banks but also that of banks that share common 
features with sanctioned banks. 
Our paper focuses on the Italian banking system, which provides an ideal case study for 
several reasons. First, Italian banks currently have a huge problem with Non-Performing Loans 
(NPLs) and exhibit substantial stability problems. As reported by the Bank of Italy (2017), the 
gross value of non-performing loans in June 2016 was 356 billion euros (i.e., 17.7% of customer 
loans),and their value net of provisions was 191 billion euros (i.e.,10.4% of customer loans): as a 
benchmark, this means that the uncovered value of NPLs is equal to 11.7% of Italian GDP in 
2015 (and the gross value of NPLs is 21.8% of Italian GDP in 2015). Of course, this creates 
problems for the stability of the Italian banking system. The Italian Government allocated 20 
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billion euros in December 2016 (1.2% of Italian GDP) to rescue Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (the oldest European bank, founded in 1492, and the third largest Italian bank, with assets 
of 164 billion euros in June 2016) and help other large banks with very high levels of NPLs. In 
the previous year, in December 2015, the Italian Government launched a bank resolution fund of 
3.6 billion euros to restructure four small-medium bank lenders (Banca Marche, Cassa di 
Risparmio di Ferrara, Cassa di Risparmio di Chieti and Banca Etruria), which were taken under 
Bank of Italy control in the past year, as they were insolvent (see Financial Times, 2015). Given 
the magnitude of the NPL problems, one may question whether the Bank of Italy’s credit-related 
enforcement actions over the last decade have been effective. Second, Italy is an interesting case 
because the Bank of Italy (the sole entity responsible for supervising Italian banks through 
November 2014) is one of the oldest banking supervisors in the world and has traditionally been 
active in controlling Italian banks through both off-site and (especially) on-site inspections. For 
example, the Governor of the Bank of Italy observed in his concluding remarks for 2010, “with 
the Bank of Italy’s supervisory role, our country has been able to count on a solid tradition. We 
have strengthened the most valid aspects of that tradition: the principles of a rigorous 
supervisory approach that was never converted to the “light touch”; supervision ready to 
persuade if possible, to prescribe if necessary, within the limits of law, performed by well-
prepared and upright public servants” (Bank of Italy, 2011, page 17). As such, the Bank of Italy 
has two separate and independent departments that perform off-site analysis and on-site 
inspections. In our study, we calculated the number of on-site inspections between 2005 and 
2013at 927 (i.e., approximately 20% of Italian banks received on-site inspections during these 
years). Additionally, we found that 328 banks in our sample had been formally sanctioned and 
that 3,588 bank employees (including members of Boards of Directors, Senior Managers, Audit 
Committee members and Chief Executive Officers) received personal sanctions. The Bank of 
Italy recorded and made public information about all its enforcement actions, with detailed 
explanations of the reasons for them, in a monthly bulletin. We were thus able to manually 
collect data on enforcement actions taken, which we classified into five categories based on their 
reasons (general organizational failure; credit risk failure; omitted credit risk disclosure; 
reporting and disclosure failure; and residual sanctions). Given the tradition of the Bank of Italy, 
one may ask whether the Bank of Italy’s credit-related enforcement actions during the last 
decade were effective? Third, the Italian banking system is one of the most important in Europe: 
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at the end 2015, Italy was the fourth largest banking market for deposits (10.7% of European 
deposits), total assets (EUR 4.0 trillion, 9% of total European banking assets) and number of 
employees (299,684 employees)1. As such, Italy represents an ideal case study: it is one of the 
main European banking industries (its instability would create instability for the whole European 
market), it has a poor-quality lending portfolio, and it has a strong tradition of supervisory on-
site inspections and enforcement actions. 
The main challenge in assessing the impact of enforcement actions on bank behavior is an 
endogeneity problem. For example, a study assessing variations in a sanctioned bank’s post-
performance (or risk-taking levels) is likely to find a statistical change, but the variation might be 
due to the bank’s pre-sanction performance (or risk-taking levels). Similarly, performance (or 
risk-taking) variations are likely to be driven by (unmeasured) factors, so there is likely to be an 
omitted variables problem. Some previous papers have attempted to address endogeneity and the 
reverse causality problem by using an instrumental variable approach. For instance, Danisewicz 
et al. (2017) used the first difference of a dummy variable indicating enforcement actions 
classified as “less severe”, a variable that assembles all measures taken against a bank’s 
personnel and individuals (civil money penalties, suspensions, fines, etc.). The authors assumed 
that these “less severe actions” would likely not be affected by the local economy (the dependent 
variable) and thus would not impact a bank’s behavior. Delis et al. (2017) used the opening of a 
new branch in a bank’s business as an instrumental variable, stating that it increases the 
probability of breaching the “law-on-the-books,” due to changes in its operational structure. 
We aim to study the effects of sanctions on sanctioned banks and the possible existence 
of spillover effects on banks that are unsanctioned but have features similar to those of 
sanctioned banks. We address the first question, using an approach similar to that of previous 
studies, i.e., an instrumental variables approach, because of possible endogeneity arising from 
the impossibility of observing the counterfactual - i.e., what would have been the behavior of a 
sanctioned bank if it had not been sanctioned? We answer the second question by calculating a 
proximity index, indicating the degree of similarity between non-sanctioned and sanctioned 
banks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review previous studies and 
develop our research hypotheses (section 2). Second, we describe our data and variables (section 
                                                 
1 Source of data: European Banking Federation (2015). 
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3) and identification strategy (section 4). We then discuss our main results (section 5). 
Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Supervision in banking: theory and hypothesis development 
Banking supervision, which consists of various tools, such as remote controls (i.e., off-site 
surveillance systems) and spot checks (i.e., on-site inspections), aims to ensure banks’ 
compliance with regulations. Although on-site and off-site supervisory tools are generally used 
in all banking systems, the mix of these tools differs across countries and depends on the 
supervisory styles adopted. For example, a “light-touch approach” is common in Northern 
European countries, such as the UK: “Before the financial crisis Britain’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) did, indeed, try to impose the lowest possible burden and cost on a prized 
industry” (the Economist, 2012) and “The lack of clarity in certain specific aspects of the 
existing mandates allowed the ‘light touch’ ethos to grow, though the FSA did not generally use 
that term” (IMF, 2011, page 10). In Southern European Countries, such as Italy, the supervisory 
style has not been as light, and both off-site and on-site tools have been adopted.  
Our paper does not investigate the effectiveness of a “light” or “heavy” touch; rather, we 
focus on the Italian experience to assess whether enforcement actions (a publicly available 
outcome of supervision) were effective. The Bank of Italy has traditionally monitored the safety 
and soundness of the banking system through a combination of on- and off-site surveillance 
programs. Off-site supervision tools are regularly used by supervisory authorities, with the 
objectives of ensuring that intermediaries comply with existing regulations, monitoring the 
evolution of business management, and verifying the effectiveness of interventions in 
eliminating deficiencies or abnormalities fostered by bank management (Bank of Italy, 2008). 
Off-site supervision is based on data publicly disclosed by banks and, especially, private 
information provided to supervisory authorities (e.g., financial data, ICAAP reports, compulsory 
regulatory reporting, mandatory disclosures relating to the detention of significant shareholdings, 
etc.). At the same time, the Bank of Italy has relied heavily on “on-site” inspections, which are 
the cornerstone of the supervisory process. Supervisors engage in three different types of 
inspections: 1) full-scope investigations, which seek to analyze the overall business of a bank, 
with specific reference to risks relevant to the supervisory authority; 2) targeted/thematic 
inspections, i.e., inspections related to specific areas of activity, areas of risk or operational or 
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technical aspects; and 3) follow-up inspections, which aim to verify the effectiveness of 
corrective actions undertaken by banks or solicited by supervisors.  
Similar to the US banking system, on-site full scope examination in Italy encompasses an 
audit procedure that focuses on capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management (M), 
earnings (E), liquidity (L) and sensitivity to market risk (S), similarly to the US CAMELS rating 
system. Under the US CAMELS system, however, the methodology is largely publicly available, 
consisting, e.g., of composite and component ratings based on a one-to-five scale, where a 
composite rating of one or two implies that any identified weaknesses are minor and can be 
handled routinely by the board of directors and management, whereas a composite rating of three 
or four suggests a combination of moderate to severe weaknesses. By contrast, there is little 
public disclosure in Italy. Once an inspection is drawn up, a summary report (with indications of 
findings and observations) is delivered to the top management of the bank for the appropriate 
counter-arguments and subsequent interventions. In cases where it is required by law, interested 
individuals will be notified of a process of assessment relating to punishable administrative 
offenses (Bank of Italy, 2012). The findings of on-site examinations and of off-site monitoring 
play an influential role in decisions to take enforcement action.  
Similar to most bank supervision systems, enforcement actions in Italy can be informal 
(i.e., actions not legally enforceable or publicly available, such as commitments, board 
resolutions, approved safety and soundness plans, and memoranda of understanding) and formal 
(i.e., actions statutorily authorized or mandated that are legally enforceable and publicly 
disclosed, such as cease and desist orders, written agreements, civil money penalties, prompt 
corrective action directives, safety and soundness orders, capital directives, and suspension, 
removal, and prohibition orders). Formal enforcement actions can be taken when analysis of a 
bank’s data (similarly to US CAMELS rating) signals problems in bank management but also 
when there are significant problems or weaknesses in its systems and controls observed in on-site 
inspections. 
In this paper, we focus on formal enforcement actions related to credit risk. Most Italian 
banks are lending-orientated. Therefore, we posit that such actions will have the most bearing on 
banks’ financial safety and soundness. Specifically, we expect that these enforcement actions 
influence bank behavior by minimizing incentives to undertake excessive credit risk activities 
through at least three basic channels (Delis et al., 2017). First, a formal enforcement action 
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signals adverse information (i.e., the supervisor holds private information on a targeted bank’s 
condition), and this is likely to enhance market discipline and so reduce a bank’s risk appetite. 
Second, formal enforcement actions can impose direct costs on a bank’s management (e.g., 
requiring an increase in human and technical resources devoted to credit-risk management, 
changes in the internal-rating system, a new assessment of credit-worthiness criteria, etc.) that 
also constrain excessive risk-taking. Third, noncompliance with formal enforcement actions 
carries serious penalties, which in turn increase the likelihood that such actions will generate 
behavioral changes. 
The main aim of our paper is to examine the impact of formal and credit-related 
enforcement actions on banks’ capital and risk among both sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
banks. Enforcement actions not only aim to penalize guilty banks but also provide examples to 
all banks in the industry that bad behavior will be penalized. Several paper shave analyzed the 
consequences of sanctions, but none have investigated the cross-effects of sanctions on non-
sanctioned banks. Specifically, Delis and Staikouras (2011), using an international sample over 
the 1998–2008 period, examine the relationship between enforcement outputs (on-site audits and 
sanctions) and bank risk. Based on 155 sanctions, they find that supervisory sanctions contribute 
considerably to constraining bank risk. Delis et al. (2017), based on a US sample, also show 
negative associations between enforcement actions (enacted by the FDIC, OCC and FRB 
between 2000 and 2010) and various bank indicators (post-sanction) such as capital, risk and 
performance. Shive and Forster (2016) and Lambert (2017) show that riskier banks are more 
likely to be subjected to enforcement actions in the U.S. but that the effects differ for those that 
lobby politicians and supervisors. Regarding the consequences of enforcement actions, 
Danisewicz et al. (2017) analyze Call Report data on all commercial and savings banks in the 
U.S. over the 1999–2011 period. They find that the issuance of enforcement actions negatively 
affects economic growth at the county level. 
After analyzing the effects of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks, our paper 
examines the existence of spillover effects on banks that are unsanctioned but share similar 
features with sanctioned banks. This is crucial information for regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, who must take into account possible effects on all banks in the system before issuing 
enforcement actions.  
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3. Data and variables 
Data were collected from various sources: enforcement actions were manually collected from the 
Bank of Italy monthly supervision bulletins between 2005 and 2013 and aggregated on an annual 
basis (Bank of Italy, 2005-2013); and accounting data were collected from the Italian Banking 
Association database on an annual basis. 
 
3.1 Supervisory variables 
We classified sanctions using various dummy variables that take values of 1 if a bank received a 
given type of sanction in year t and 0 otherwise. We created a variable for each of the following 
sanctions: 1) deficiencies in organizational and internal controls - general organizational failure 
- S1; 2) faults in the organization, internal controls and management related to lending, e.g., 
inaccuracy in the credit process and analysis of borrowers’ creditworthiness -credit risk failure - 
S2; 3) lack of reporting on impaired loans and loan loss provisions to the supervisory authority -
omitted credit risk disclosure - S3; 4) all cases of inaccurate or missing reports -reporting and 
disclosure failure - S4(such as (a) inaccurate or missing reports on a large loan to the Supervisory 
Board,(b) inaccurate or missing reports to the Central Credit Register on any loans,(c) any late 
communications to the supervisory authority,(d) deficiencies in the process of reporting and 
control of consolidated reports, and (e) inaccurate or missing communications to customers 
regarding regulations); 5) residual sanctions (S5). Each of these variables indicates the number of 
sanctions issued. We also define credit-risk related sanctions as a dummy variable that takes 
value of 1 if a bank received S2 and/or S3 and zero otherwise. We summarize the definitions of 
the variables used in the empirical analysis in Table 1. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 1> 
 
After matching all the data, we obtained a sample of 328 banks that had been subject to 
enforcement actions. The total number of sanctioned banks is inferior to the total number of 
individual enforcement actions because some banks received more than one sanction in the 
period analyzed. We address the multiple sanctions problem by including only observations of 
sanctions related to credit risk (S2 and S3) or disclosure failure (S1 and S4); in all other cases, we 
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drop observations to attain a cleaner dataset. To face potential confounding effects2, we also drop 
observation at time t+1 for banks that received an enforcement action at time t. As reported in 
Table 2, Panel A, the most frequent sanction is related to ‘general organizational failure’ (225 
cases), followed by deficiencies in the credit process (206 cases). Sanctions related to credit risk 
(S2 and S3) were the most numerous, comprising 310 cases. In 2011, we observed the largest 
number of banks (44) sanctioned for credit risk (CRS), followed by 2007 and 2005.  
As shown in Panel B of Table 2, the largest number of observations concerns cooperative 
banks, followed by commercial banks and saving banks. The number of foreign banks is 
negligible.  
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 2> 
 
 
3.2. Bank-level and macroeconomic variables 
Data relating to accounting and financial information were selected from the Italian Banking 
Association database. As shown in Table 2, we group our variables in three categories: 
supervisory variables, independent variables and dependent variables.  
The effects of sanctions are analyzed by focusing on various indicators of bank risk, 
capital adequacy and activities, as in previous research (Delis et al. 2017). First, we calculate a 
regulatory risk indicator, i.e., the ratio of regulatory risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA). 
We then define two measures of bank credit portfolio quality the ratio of non-performing loans 
to a bank’s regulatory capital (NPL1) and the ratio of non-performing loans to a bank’s total 
loans (NPL2). We capture liquidity risk with the Liquidity Ratio (LIQ), i.e. the ratio of cash due 
from banks to total demand deposits. We measure banks’ capital adequacy with two indicators, 
namely, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER1) and the ratio of Tier 2 capital 
to risk-weighted assets (TIER2). Finally, we measure banking activities by examining credit 
orientation (i.e., the ratio of total loans to total assets) and bond investment (government bonds + 
local government bonds + short-term corporate bonds and corporate bonds) / (total assets - 
tangible fixed assets - intangible fixed assets). 
                                                 
2 We would like to thank one of the referees for making this suggestion. 
11 
We also included various control variables related to bank profitability (Return on Assets, 
ROA), size (the logarithm of Total Assets), cost efficiency (operating cost over the 
intermediation margin), exposure to the interbank market in terms of both credit and debt volume 
(CRI and DBI, denoting, respectively, the ratio of credits to the interbank market to Total credit 
and the ratio of debt to the interbank market to Total debt). We also measure bank stability using 
Z-scores, which have been extensively used in the banking literature (as in Houston et al., 2010; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014, 
among others). The Z-score is a proxy for a bank’s distance to default (i.e., the number of 
standard deviations by which a bank’s profitability must fall to devour its entire capital buffer) 
and is calculated as: 
 (1) 
 
where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks; the j subscript denotes 
the Italian regions (20 regions); t denotes the time dimension; Zi,t is the Z-score; 
𝐸
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
denotes the 
leverage ratio (i.e., the share of total equity (E) in total assets (TA)), ROA is the return on assets, 
and σ(ROA) is the one- year regional time varying standard deviation of the return on assets.3 A 
high Z-score implies a lower default probability. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we 
smoothed the extreme values by taking the logarithmic transformation of the variable, following 
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Schaeck and Cihak (2012). 
In Panels C and D of Table 2, we report some descriptive statistics of dependent and 
independent variables used in our empirical analysis. The core business of Italian banks is mostly 
lending (the mean value of the loans to customers on total assets ratio is 76%) and this lending 
orientation is also associated with high credit risk levels: non-performing loans represent  (on 
average) 31% of regulatory capital and 4% of total loans. Regarding capital levels, the 
meanTIER1ratio is 17% and Tier 2 ratio is 1.2%. The mean return on assets is 5% and operating 
efficiency (measured by operating cost to income ratio) is (on average) 70%. Market funding 
covers 23% of total assets. 
                                                 
3If a bank presents branches in more than one region, the standard deviation for each year is calculated at the national level using 
all available data. 
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=
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3.3 Preliminary inspections 
In this section, we run some preliminarily investigation to analyze if there are some differences 
in risk-taking in means between sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks. Specifically, we report in 
the Table 3 the t-tests for differences in means among our dependent variables (Panel A) and 
independent variables (Panel B).  
As expected, the two groups of banks (i.e. the ones receiving an enforcement action in a 
given year and the ones that did not receive any sanctions? in that year) have different mean 
levels of risks. Specifically, sanctioned banks display a higher mean level (significant at the 1% 
level) of non-performing loans (NPL1, and NPL2) and regulatory risk (RWA) than non-
sanctioned banks. Interestingly, non-sanctioned banks have a greater TIER1 capital (significant 
at the 1% level) than sanctioned banks focusing on the TIER1 ratio, but lower TIER2capital 
(significant at the 5% level). Finally, non-sanctioned banks have a greater amount of credits on 
the total assets (TLTA) than the sanctioned banks (significant at the 10% level). The means of 
the other variables are not statistically different within the two groups of banks. In Table 4, we 
report the correlations among our variables. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLES 3 and 4> 
 
4. Identification strategy 
We adopt a two-step identification strategy: first, we present our econometric approach (section 
4.1); then we explain our instrumental variable and identification strategy (section 4.2). Finally, 
we present the methodology for calculating the spillover effect (section 4.3). 
 
4.1Econometric model 
Empirically, we seek to estimate the effects of credit enforcement actions on several measures of 
bank activity. In doing so, we address the endogeneity problem that arises from the fact that we 
cannot observe how sanctioned banks might have behaved had they not been subject to formal 
enforcement actions. If we do not take into account possible endogeneity, least-squares-based 
methods are biased and inconsistent. 
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Following past papers that have examined the impact of an endogenous event on various 
aspects of banking, we use a two-stage Instrumental Variables (IV) model. In the first step, 
following Angrist (2001), we estimate a linear regression of the endogenous regressor on the 
instruments by least squares as follows: 
 
CRSit = α0 + β0Zit + γ0 Xit-1 +μit (1) 
 
In the second step, we regress the outcome on the predicted value of the endogenous 
regressor, using least squares: 
 
 
(2) 
 
where CRS is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank is sanctioned for credit risk 
(i.e., if S2 or S3takes a value of 1) and zero otherwise; Z are the instrumental variables; and the Xs 
are the exogenous variables, i.e., a vector of bank-level variables. To overcome the missing 
variables problem, we estimate a model with fixed effects for bank specialization (to account for 
time invariant differences among bank categories), and years (to consider the effects of 
differences among years over the sample period). We also cluster standard errors at the bank 
level.4 
We consider five different dependent variables that may be affected by credit risk 
sanctions: i) the ratio of total non-performing loans to regulatory capital (NPL1); ii) the ratio of 
Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER1); iii) the ratio of Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted 
assets (TIER2); iv) the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA); and v) the ratio of total 
loans to total assets (TLTA).  
Additionally, we employ three other dependent variables: vi) the ratio of total non-
performing loans to total assets (NPL2); vii) the ratio of total bonds to total assets, excluding 
tangible and intangible fixed assets (BOND); and viii) the ratio of liquidity and interbank credit 
to total assets (LIQ). NPL2 is an alternative measure of non-performing loans; BOND measures 
the share of securities among total assets to investigate whether the weight of securities among 
                                                 
4 In estimating our empirical models, we dropped the observation at time t+1for each bank that received an enforcement action at 
the time t to face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for making this suggestion.  
^
1 1 1 1 1 1it it t itY CRS X e  + − += + + +
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total assets grows in the year following sanction; LIQ is a placebo dependent variable that we 
assume does not vary with credit risk sanctions. All independent variables are lagged one year. 
We provide definitions of all the variables in Table 1. 
Equations (1) and (2) are simultaneously estimated, with error terms assumed to be 
jointly normally distributed. The coefficient of interest isb1, which measures the effect of 
sanctions on banks not directly subject to sanctions. 
The fundamental problem for the reliability of the results relates to the choice and validity 
of the instruments. We consider this problem in more detail in the next section. 
 
4.2 Instrumental variables and identification strategy 
The instrumental variables estimates become important in the presence of endogeneity and 
reverse causality, i.e., in contexts where exogeneity may not hold. The presence of omitted 
variables, measurement errors and simultaneity can negatively affect the results of the estimates. 
The IV approach can resolve this problem if the following assumptions hold: i) the IV are 
correlated with the endogenous regressors (relevance criterion), i.e., E [Z'X]  0; ii) the IV are 
not correlated with the error term (exogeneity, also called the orthogonality condition), i.e., 
E[Z'U] = 0; and iii) the IV do not directly affect the dependent variable (exclusion criterion). If 
ii) and iii) hold, the instruments are valid. If i) holds, but the correlations between the 
instruments and the endogenous regressors are small, the instruments are valid but weak. 
The choice of instruments is therefore crucial. We select two instruments: the sanction 
imposed for general organizational failure (S1) and the sanction imposed for disclosure failure 
(S4). These two variables are satisfactory from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. 
Specifically, our dependent variable is related to bank credit risk-taking (e.g., the Non-
performing Loan Ratio, the Total loan ratio, the Risk Weighted asset ratio) and capital adequacy 
(the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios). Because Italian banks are mostly lending-oriented commercial 
banks, the RWA and the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios are more closely related to credit risk than to 
other financial risks taken by banks. Thus, there is no reason to expect that sanctions imposed for 
general organizational failure (S1) and for disclosure failure (S2) directly relate to bank credit risk 
or capital levels. This theoretical expectation is also supported by empirical data: the correlation 
with our endogenous variable is high (the supervisory authority often simultaneously sanctions 
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banks for credit risk, general organizational failure and disclosure failure), while the correlation 
with our dependent variables is low, as they are directly related to credit risk.  
As we have two instrumental variables and only one endogenous variable, we can 
implement the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: under the joint null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, the test statistic follows a chi-
squared distribution in the number of over-identifying restrictions. 
 
4.3 The spillover effect 
Our second (and main) question addresses the spillover effect: do enforcement actions against 
competitors influence the risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks? We expect that banks that are 
“closer” to sanctioned banks may undertake actions to reduce the risk of being sanctioned. In this 
case, sanctions issued by a supervisory authority could achieve the dual purpose of punishing 
problematic banks and discouraging other banks from engaging in problematic behavior, thereby 
incentivizing virtuous behavior. 
To test our hypothesis, we measure the distance between each non-sanctioned bank and 
the mean of sanctioned banks. Specifically, we use the square root of the Mahalanobis distance, 
which has been widely adopted in finance to measure distances between firms. The Mahalanobis 
distance, a measure of distance in multidimensional space, has several interesting properties: i) it 
accounts for covariance among variables; and ii) it reduces to the Euclidean distance for 
uncorrelated variables with unit variance. It is obtained as: 
 (3) 
 
where X consists of TIER1, TIER2, TLTA, SIZE, ROA, LIQ, and Z-SCORE at time t, and the 
subscript i indicates an unsanctioned bank.  
We normalize the Mahalanobis distance so that the variables considered have a common 
variation field, using the following formula: 
 
(4) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
' 1
,E i s i si s
D X X E X C X E X−= − −
Mahalanobis-min(Mahalanobis)
Mahalanobis=
max(Mahalanobis)-min(Mahalanobis)
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Once we measure the distance of each unsanctioned bank from sanctioned banks, we 
again run equations (1) and (2), focusing only on unsanctioned banks and replacing the dummy 
variable measuring sanctions with the Mahalanobis distance. We also use as an instrument the 
lagged value of the Mahalanobis distance5. 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we discuss our empirical findings. First, we show the effects of enforcement 
actions on sanctioned banks - the banks that are the direct targets of such actions - (section 5.1) 
and we perform several robustness checks (section 5.2). We then show the effects of 
enforcement actions on non-sanctioned banks (section 5.3). 
 
5.1 The effects of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks 
Table 5 shows the results for the five dependent variables. We report the second stage of the 
regressions and the value of the coefficients and standard errors of the two instrumental variables 
in the first stage. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 5> 
 
Our variable of interest is the credit risk sanction (CRS). As shown in column 1 of Table 
5, enforcement actions for credit risk-related reasons are followed (after one year) by an increase 
in the value of non-performing loans compared with regulatory capital (NPL1), an effect that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The high value of the estimated coefficient suggests that 
when banks are sanctioned, they off-load non-performing loans in an effort to clean their balance 
sheets. This approach naturally results in a higher value of non-performing loans in the year 
following sanction and at the same time leads to more truthful accounting. Specifically, NPL1 
increases by 0.24 points. This result contrasts with previous research (e.g., Delis et al., 2017), 
partly because different accounting principles were adopted and partly due to the different 
intensities of the financial crises that have affected Italy. As a result of a higher volume of NPLs, 
in fact, there was a larger volume of loan loss provisioning that banks that were already troubled 
could not support. Basically, it is believed that many banks delayed the classification of 
                                                 
5 In this case, because the number of instruments equals the number of endogenous variables, we cannot run the Sargan-Hansen 
test for over-identifying restrictions. 
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problematic loans. However, correct classification becomes inevitable when a sanction is 
imposed. 
Consistent with this result, we find (column 2) a similar effect with respect to the ratio 
banks’ risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA). A credit risk sanction causes an increase in 
RWA, although the impact is smaller, at just 0.05 points. The coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Although this result may appear counterintuitive—one would expect that 
sanctioned banks would react by reducing their RWA, as in Delis et al. (2017)—this is consistent 
with our findings regarding NPL1. Specifically, our results suggest that sanctioned banks become 
riskier from a regulatory perspective (as captured by RWA) as they clean up their balance sheets 
(captured by NPL1). We also observe that banks experiment with a reduction in Tier 1 capital 
(column 3) and an increase in Tier 2 capital (column 3): these results are consistent with the 
higher non-performing loans ratio and the higher risk weighted assets ratio, suggesting that banks 
could not increase their Tier1 capital to cover credit losses and so increased their Tier2 capital, 
probably by issuing subordinated loans. In sum, there is a statistically significant impact on 
willingness to lend (TLTA), as the total loan ratio falls by 0.06 points. This reduction probably 
depends on a reduction in performing loans in the balance sheets that is not offset by an increase 
in new loans. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement actions reduce banks’ 
ability to intermediate between loans and deposits (Danisewicz et al., 2017). 
Overall, our results strongly suggest that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks, in the 
year following sanctions, to offload problematic loans and reduce their lending orientation, 
behavior associated with a reduction in Tier 1 capital and an increase in Tier 2 capital. 
Turning to the instrumental variables, both S1 and S4 are always statistically significant at 
the 1% level, with positive signs in the first stage. This shows that the penalty for credit risk is 
positively associated with sanctions linked to organizational and general disclosures failure. All 
five estimations reject the under-identifying restrictions test: we reject the null hypothesis that 
the IV is uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor at the 1% level. We also reject the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments at the 1% level, excluding instruments that are weakly correlated 
with the endogenous regressor. Finally, in all our estimations, we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
over-identifying restrictions. Thus, the instruments are valid. In Table 6, we follow-up on these 
results by estimating the effects of sanctions on three other variables, namely, the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL2), the ratio of a bank’s exposure to government bonds to its 
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non-fixed assets (BOND), and the ratio of a bank’s highly liquid assets (i.e., cash and interbank 
credit) to total assets (LIQ). Using these three measures, we achieve different objectives. The 
first variable enables us to run a robustness check: specifically, we measure bank loan portfolio 
quality differently, so that we can check the consistency of the results reported in Table 5. The 
second variable allows us to complement our analysis of lending: specifically, if sanctioned 
banks really want to reduce their risk-taking, their reduction in lending should be associated with 
an increase in safe assets. We expect banks, whether sanctioned or not, to increase their 
purchases of government bonds, absorbing less regulatory capital than loans. The third variable, 
i.e. highly liquid assets (cash and interbank credit), is a sort of placebo variable, as the credit 
risk-related sanction son which we focus are not expected to affect a bank’s liquidity 
management.   
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 6> 
 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6, credit risk-related sanctions affect NPL2in a way that 
is strongly consistent with their effect onNPL1, as seen in Table 5, although the impact is 
smaller. As such, our conclusions are not influenced by the measure selected to account for loan 
portfolio quality. In column 2, we show that in the following period, sanctioned banks increase 
their purchases of securities (riskless or less risky assets) relative to loans, but this is only 
significant at the 10% level. This confirms our conclusion from Table 5: when banks are 
sanctioned, they complement their decline in lending with an increase in their holdings of 
government bonds to reduce their risk-taking. In column 3, we show that credit risk-related 
sanctions have no statistically significant effect on the liquidity ratio. 
 
5.2 Some Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks. First, we test whether market discipline affects the 
behavior of sanctioned banks relative to non-sanctioned ones. We then examine the effects of 
financial crises on sanctioned banks. 
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Market discipline (MKTDIS) is calculated as the ratio of market funding to total assets6. 
We interact this variable with credit risk sanction to examine whether market discipline 
increases the effects of sanctions. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 7> 
 
As shown in Table 7, a higher market-funding ratio is associated with a decline of non-
performing loans (NPL1), and an increase in  lending activities (TLTA). The overall effect of a 
higher market-funding ratio is a positive link with the risk weighed asset ratio (RWA): this 
suggests that banks tend to collect market-funds to finance risky business investments (such as 
loans, which have high supervisory risk-weights) rather than other assets (e.g. liquid assets) 
with low supervisory risk-weights. This is not surprising since collecting markets are not a non-
zero cost source of funds (therefore  banks need to provide investors with adequate coupons to 
successfully place their instruments).  Consequently, banks have to invest these funds in a 
profitable (and risky) way. The variable of main interest is the interaction variable between 
CRS and MKTDIS. The interaction is highly significant in three of five models. The effect of 
sanctions, combined with market discipline, is to increase the number of non-performing loans 
(NPL1), the risk weighed asset ratio (RWA), and the total loans ratio (TLTA). Once a sanction is 
implemented, the market forces banks to clean their balance sheets more thoroughly, leading to 
an increase in risky assets and a reduction in total loans. The interaction variable for TIER1 and 
TIER2is not significant, but market discipline leads to a decrease in TIER1 and an increase in 
TIER2, in line with the results in Table 5. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 8> 
 
The effect of the interaction between market discipline and credit risk sanctions is 
statistically significant and relevant in terms of magnitude of the coefficient. Additionally (as 
shown in Table 7), the interaction between market discipline and the second variable for non-
performing loans (NPL2) is significant, confirming the regulators’ view expressed in Pillar 3 of 
Basel 3. Conversely, the interaction between market discipline and credit risk sanctions is not 
                                                 
6 We would like to thank one of the referees for this suggestion. 
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significant when we use bond and liquid ratios (respectively, BOND and LIQ) as dependent 
variables. 
In the second robustness check, we test the effect of financial crises7. Specifically, we 
investigate whether the 2007 financial crisis played a role in banks’ reactions to enforcement 
actions. We therefore interact the credit risk sanction variable with a dummy variable that 
captures the crisis (i.e., a variable that assumes a value of 1 in the more problematic years of the 
financial crisis in Italy following the 2007 credit crisis through the end of the sovereign debt 
crisis in 2012). 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 9> 
 
The results in Table 9 confirm and bolster our basic estimations. During the financial 
crisis, the effects of sanctions are stronger on non-performing loans (NPL1), risk weighted 
assets (RWA), total loans (TLTA) and, as shown in Table 10, NPL2. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 10> 
 
 
5.3 The enforcement actions’ effects on unsanctioned banks 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence pertaining to whether enforcement actions against 
competitors influence the risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks. Specifically, we posit that a non-
sanctioned bank cares about enforcement actions taken against other similar banks and modifies 
its own risk-taking in response. 
We repeated the analysis of models (1) and (2), now focusing only on banks not subjected 
to enforcement actions and replacing the sanction variables with the square root of the 
Mahalanobis distance. The interpretation of the latter variable is straightforward: as the 
Mahalanobis distance of a bank increases, the bank increasingly differs from sanctioned banks. 
Because we are positing that non-sanctioned banks that are “similar” to sanctioned banks behave 
in a similar manner, we expect that the estimated coefficient for this variable is statistically 
significant and takes a sign opposite that of the sanction dummy. 
                                                 
7 We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting us this additional test. 
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< INSERT HERE TABLE 11> 
 
In column (1) of Table 11, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
the Mahalanobis distance: this suggests that the more distant a non-sanctioned bank is from 
sanctioned banks, the more it reduces its ratio of non-performing loans to regulatory capital. 
Accordingly, non-sanctioned banks that are close to sanctioned banks increase their NPL ratios, 
a result that is strongly consistent with our result in Table 5 that sanctioned banks increase their 
NPL ratios. Overall, this suggests that non-sanctioned banks similar to sanctioned banks clean 
their balance sheets by offloading non-performing loans. This is also a possible spillover effect 
of sanctions: non-sanctioned banks bring problematic loans to light in anticipation of regulatory 
intervention. Interestingly, non-sanctioned banks appear to encounter the same difficulties as 
sanctioned banks in increasing their Tier1 ratios. In fact, the more distant a bank is from 
sanctioned banks, the greater is its ability to increase its Tier1 ratio. This effect is consistent 
with our previous findings for sanctioned banks. 
In terms of the Risk Weighted Asset ratio, the Mahalanobis distance shows a positive 
link: as a bank becomes more distant from sanctioned banks, it increases its Risk-Weighted 
Asset Ratio. This result is intuitive (non-sanctioned banks reduce their RWA, the more similar 
they are to sanctioned banks, as they load non-performing loans) but inconsistent with our 
finding regarding sanctioned banks (which increase their RWA). This suggests that the process 
of cleaning their balance sheets (captured by the NPL1) is less comprehensive for non-
sanctioned banks than for sanctioned banks: non-sanctioned banks can reduce their RWA, while 
sanctioned bank increase theirs. 
Finally, we observe a positive link between the Mahalanobis distance and the total loan 
ratio: the more distant a bank is from sanctioned banks, the greater are its lending activities. 
This result is intuitive: non-sanctioned banks reduce their lending by larger amounts, the more 
similar they are to sanctioned banks.  
These results are confirmed by analyzing other variables of interest, as reported in Table 
12. 
 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 12> 
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The effect of non-performing loans on non-sanctioned banks similar to sanctioned banks 
is confirmed by the second variable of interest, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
(NPL2). This result reinforces the effect of similarity on the behavior of non-sanctioned banks 
that are “close” to sanctioned banks and confirms our results in Table 6. This effect is also 
confirmed for BOND: the positive sign of the coefficient, which is highly significant and of the 
same magnitude as the corresponding coefficient in Table 6, indicates that non-sanctioned 
banks that are similar to sanctioned banks increase their portfolio of bonds. Moreover, the data 
indicate that such banks increase their liquidity. 
Overall, our results provide empirical evidence that there is a spillover effect: non-
sanctioned banks care about the enforcement actions taken against other similar banks and 
modify their own risk-taking behavior in response. Our results, which clearly show that banks 
become more prudent after sanctions, support public disclosure of enforcement actions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
By focusing on the Italian banking industry (an ideal case study, given the magnitude of NPLs 
and the tradition of the Bank of Italy in supervising banks through on-site inspections and 
enforcement actions), our paper examines the effects of enforcement actions on banks. We show 
that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks, in the year following the imposition of sanctions, to 
offload problematic loans and reduce their lending orientation, behavior associated with a 
reduction in Tier 1 capital and an increase in Tier 2 capital. We also provide empirical evidence 
that non-sanctioned banks behave more similarly to sanctioned banks; the more similar they are 
to sanctioned banks. 
Our results are particularly relevant to supervisory authorities, as the question of whether 
corrective supervisory actions should be publicly disclosed—to show that bad behavior by banks 
is punished, leading to more prudent behavior—or remain confidential—to prevent panic and 
reduce the risk of a systemic crisis—has been subject to debate. Our results favor public 
disclosure of enforcement actions, as even non-sanctioned banks modify their behavior and risk-
taking in response to enforcement actions. This conclusion supports the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) approach to enforcement actions, whereby “The European Central Bank 
shall publish on its website without undue delay, and after the decision has been notified to the 
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supervised entity concerned, any decision imposing an administrative penalty […] including 
information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the supervised entity 
concerned, unless publication in this manner would either: (a) jeopardize the stability of the 
financial markets or an on-going criminal investigation; or (b) cause, insofar as it can be 
determined, disproportionate damage to the supervised entity concerned”(ECB, 2014 art.132). 
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Table 1 – Variable Description 
 
This table reports variables used in the empirical analysis and a description of the calculation procedure. 
 
Variables Symbol Description 
Supervisory variables8 
Sanction 1 S1 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank received an enforcement action 
with reference to deficiencies in organization and internal controls (general 
organizational failure) in the year, and zero otherwise 
Sanction 2 S2 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank received an enforcement action 
with reference to deficiencies in the credit process (credit risk failure) in the year, 
and zero otherwise  
Sanction 3 S3 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank received an enforcement action 
with reference to impaired loans and loan loss provisions not reported to the 
Supervisory Authority (omitted credit risk disclosure) in the year, and zero otherwise  
Sanction 4 S4 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1if a bank received an enforcement action 
with reference to violation of disclosure regulations to customers or lacking in 
reporting, communication to the Supervisory Authority other than credit risk 
(reporting and disclosure failure) in the year, and zero otherwise  
Sanction 5 S5 A dummy variable that takes a value of 1if a bank received an enforcement action in 
the year with reference to reasons other than those pertaining to sanctions 1 to 4, and 
zero otherwise (residual sanctions) 
Credit Sanction CRS 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if S2 or S3 takes a value of 1,and 0 
otherwise  
   
Bank dependent variables  
Liquidity Ratio LIQ (Cash + interbank credits) / Total asset 
Non-performing Loans 
Ratio 1 
NPL1 Non-performing loans / Regulatory capital 
Non-performing Loans 
Ratio 2 
NPL2 Non-performing loans / Total loans 
Risk-weighted Asset Ratio RWA Risk-weighted assets / Total assets 
Tier 1 Ratio TIER1  Tier 1 / Risk-weighted assets 
Tier 2 Ratio TIER2 Tier 2 / Risk-weighted assets 
Total Loans Ratio TLTA Total loans / Total asset 
Bond Investment Ratio BOND (Government bonds + local government bonds + short-term corporate bonds and 
corporate bonds) / (total assets - tangible fixed assets - intangible fixed assets) 
Market discipline MKTDIS Market funding/ total assets  
Crisis CRISIS A dummy variable that takes a value of 1for years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,and 2012 
and zero otherwise 
Mahalanobis distance MAHA The normalized square root of the square distance between a vector of covariates of 
each non-sanctioned bank and the centroid of sanctioned banks. Covariates are: 
Tier1, Tier2, Size, ROA, Liquidity ratio, Z-score. 
Bank independent variables  
Cost to Income  CTI Operating costs / Intermediation margin 
Credits to interbank market CRI Credits to interbank market / Total credits 
Debts to interbank market DBI Debts to interbank market / Total debts 
Return on Assets ROA Before-tax profits / Total assets 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
Z score Z-SCORE Natural logarithm of: [(Total equity / Total assets TA)+ ROA] / Standard deviation of 
ROA 
Commercial bank CMB A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if bank is a commercial bank and zero 
otherwise 
Cooperative bank COB A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is a Cooperative bank and zero 
otherwise 
Savings bank SVB A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is a Savings bank and zero 
otherwise 
Foreign bank FRB A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is a foreign bank and zero 
otherwise 
                                                 
8 Running the estimation, we drop the observation at time t+1 for sanctioned banks. Specifically, let assume that a bank i receive 
an enforcement action in a given year (i.e. any of the sanctions from S1 to CRS), we drop the bank i observation at time t+1 to 
avoid possible confusion in our results. We would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistic of sanction variables 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of enforcement variables for sanctioned banks; Panel B presents those related 
to independent variables; Panel C and D variables are at the bank and macro-level. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Reported values are winsorized at the 99th and at 1st percentile. 
 
Panel A – Sanctioned banks through years  
Years Total CRS Non-sanctioned S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
2005 37 29 615 23 23 15 2 4 
2006 22 17 650 12 13 14 6 6 
2007 51 39 641 29 33 17 8 8 
2008 28 20 663 16 16 10 2 6 
2009 29 16 674 21 15 9 1 5 
2010 42 30 623 31 28 16 9 14 
2011 61 44 590 55 42 11 8 11 
2012 27 14 574 22 13 4 5 4 
2013 31 24 539 16 23 8 4 7 
Total 328 233   225 206 104 45 65 
 
Panel B – Bank specialization 
Years  CMB COB SVB FRB 
2005 194 426 30 2 
2006 209 433 29 1 
2007 220 439 33 0 
2008 221 435 35 0 
2009 243 423 36 1 
2010 216 416 33 0 
2011 202 412 33 1 
2012 178 385 34 1 
2013 162 374 31 0 
 
Panel C – Dependent variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BOND 5,191 0.1629 0.1285 0.0000 0.1416 0.5823 
LIQ 5,194 0.0126 0.0126 0.000 0.0067 0.1195 
NPL1 5,159 0.3120 0.3357 0.000 0.2136 1.8943 
NPL2 5,194 0.0404 0.0386 0.000 0.0291 0.2041 
RWA 5,194 0.6547 0.2082 0.000 0.6709 1.2031 
TIER1 5,194 0.1728 0.1264 0.000 0.1406 0.8953 
TIER2 5,130 0.0123 0.0186 -0.0007 0.0036 0.0858 
TLTA 5,194 0,7599 0.1348 0.3047 0.7797 0.9779 
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Panel D – Independent variables  
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CTI 4,903 0.7048 0.2996 0.2018 0.6637 2.7542 
CRI 5,194 0.1621 0.1903 0.0087 0.0992 0.9867 
DBI 5,182 0.1513 0.2187 0.0000 0.0608 0.9966 
ROA 5,846 0.0052 0.1189 -0.0566 0.0065 0.0325 
MKTDIS 5,194 0.2306 0.1302 0.0000 0.2299 0.4820 
SIZE 5,846 13.1614 1.7100 10.0890 12.9096 18.1914 
Z-SCORE 5,832 2.1096 0.9671 -0.6141 2.1813 3.9711 
MAHA 5,124 0.1008 0.1664 0.0000 0.0423 1.0000 
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Table 3 – Difference in mean  
This table presents t-tests for dependent variables (panel A) and independent variables (Panel b) related to the 
significance of the difference in mean values between sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in Table 1. All tests take into account different variances between the two groups. *** indicates significance 
of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent;* between 5 and 10 percent. 
 
Panel A – Dependent variables  
 BOND LIQ NPL1*** NPL2*** RWA*** TIER1 *** TIER2** TLTA* 
No. of non-sanctioned 4,900 4,903 4,870 4,903 4,903 4,903 4,840 4,903 
No. of  sanctioned 291 291 289 291 291 291 290 291 
Mean of non-sanctioned 0.1623 0.0127 0.3013 0.0391 0.6523 0.1741 0.0122 0.7606 
Mean of sanctioned 0.1727 0.0117 0.4931 0.0621 0.6936 0.1512 0.0147 0.7480 
Standard error of non-sanctioned 0.0018 0.0003 0.0047 0.0005 0.0030 0.0018 0.0003 0.0019 
Standard of error of sanctioned 0.0071 0.0010 0.0238 0.0025 0.0118 0.0060 0.0012 0.0071 
Diff in mean -0.0134 0.0009 -0.1917 -0.0230 -0.0412 0.0229 -0.0025 0.0126 
T -1.4008 0.9405 -7.8857 -8.7111 -3.3851 3.6676 -2.0582 1.7144 
 
Panel B – Independent variables  
  CTI CRI DBI ROA*** SIZE 
Log Z-
SCORE*** 
MAHA*** 
No. of non-sanctioned 4,903 4,903 4,889 5,518 5,518 5,505 4,835 
No. of  sanctioned 291 291 291 328 328 327 289 
Mean of non-sanctioned 0.7034 0.1626 0.1510 0.0054 13.1607 2.1188 0.8986 
Mean of sanctioned 0.7289 0.1547 0.1569 0.0018 13.1729 1.9536 0.9086 
Standard error of non-sanctioned 0.0043 0.0027 0.0031 0.0001 0.0229 0.0130 0.0024 
Standard of error of sanctioned 0.0151 0.0110 0.0118 0.0007 0.0998 0.0525 0.0083 
Diff in mean -0.0255 0.0079 -0.0059 0.0037 -0.0122 0.1651 -0.0010 
T -1.6206 0.7529 -0.4828 4.9028 -0.1193 3.0504 -1.1597 
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Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix between some variables. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level are reported in 
bold characters. 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 NPL1 1.00 
                 2 MKTDIS -0.02 1.00 
                3 RWA -0.02 0.32 1.00 
               4 TIER1 -0.24 -0.27 -0.32 1.00 
              5 TIER2 0.08 0.05 -0.15 -0.07 1.00 
             6 TLTA 0.07 0.22 0.35 -0.32 -0.00 1.00 
            7 NPL2 0.44 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
           8 BOND -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 1.00 
          9 LIQ 0.04 -0.09 -0.16 0.09 0.04 -0.28 0.01 0.02 1.00 
         10 CTI -0.04 -0.18 -0.10 0.28 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 1.00 
        11 CRI -0.21 -0.38 -0.47 0.39 0.02 -0.22 -0.07 -0.00 0.04 0.24 1.00 
       12 DBI 0.16 -0.12 -0.20 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.18 1.00 
      13 ROA -0.33 0.05 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.01 0.04 -0.65 -0.08 -0.12 1.00 
     14 SIZE 0.19 -0.01 -0.16 -0.27 0.34 0.21 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.29 0.00 0.45 0.06 1.00 
    15 Z-SCORE -0.28 -0.05 0.19 0.26 -0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.20 0.19 -0.35 1.00 
   16 S1 0.13 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 1.00 
  17 CRS 0.15 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.66 1.00 
 18 S4 0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.27 0.27 1.00 
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Table 5 - The effect of the credit risk enforcement actions 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects model of 
equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in the second stage. 
Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each regression are noted in the first line of the 
table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at time t+1 for each bank that received an 
enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for giving us 
this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard errors for the two instrumental variables. ***indicates 
significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 percent. 
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NPL1 RWA TIER1 TIER2 TLTA 
CRS 0.2572*** 0.0600*** -0.0175* 0.0054** -0.0638*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0232) (0.0102) (0.0024) (0.0153) 
NPL1  -0.0559*** -0.0435*** 0.0007 0.0081 
  (0.0121) (0.0081) (0.0013) (0.0097) 
RWA -0.2288***  -0.1512*** -0.0015 0.1876*** 
 (0.0423)  (0.0166) (0.0019) (0.0166) 
TIER1 -0.0044*** -0.0032***  -0.0001** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0000) (0.0003) 
TIER2 0.0909 -0.1722 -0.2741**  -0.4692*** 
 (0.2805) (0.1530) (0.1223)  (0.1254) 
TLTA 0.1543*** 0.3845*** -0.1851*** -0.0169***  
 (0.0541) (0.0258) (0.0232) (0.0032)  
CTI -0.3294*** -0.0136 0.0324** 0.0068*** 0.0521*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0227) (0.0160) (0.0022) (0.0174) 
CRI -0.3931*** -0.2963*** 0.0572*** -0.0039 -0.1364*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0226) (0.0186) (0.0026) (0.0219) 
DBI -0.0294 0.0236 0.0377*** 0.0080*** -0.0140 
 (0.0375) (0.0200) (0.0123) (0.0021) (0.0154) 
ROA -12.4131*** -1.3598** -0.1290 -0.0838* -0.2214 
 (1.2437) (0.6133) (0.3262) (0.0504) (0.4286) 
SIZE -0.0089* -0.0235*** -0.0117*** 0.0033*** 0.0117*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0018) 
Z-SCORE -0.0251*** 0.0411*** 0.0303*** -0.0011*** 0.0027 
 (0.0062) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Constant 1.1706*** 0.6884*** 0.5242*** -0.0166*** 0.4386*** 
 (0.0991) (0.0532) (0.0369) (0.0056) (0.0382) 
No. of observations 4,080 4,169 4,085 4,088 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:      
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 175.238 170.772 167.469 168.180 167.936 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.4236 0.8034 0.7299 0.2243 0.6204 
      
First Stage 
S1 0.6217*** 0.6000*** 0.6036*** 0.6117*** 0.6043*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0392) 
S4 0.2631*** 0.2661*** 0.2600*** 0.2333*** 0.2604*** 
 (0.0783) (0.0754) (0.0770) (0.0761) (0.0770) 
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Table 6 - The effect of the credit risk enforcement actions – further estimations 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at 
time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We 
would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard 
errors of the two instrumental variables. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * 
between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) (2) (3) 
NPL2 BOND LIQ 
CRS 0.0337*** 0.2087 -0.0010 
 (0.0048) (0.1270) (0.0025) 
NPL1  -0.0087 0.0042** 
  (0.0168) (0.0017) 
RWA -0.0098** -0.1071*** -0.0030 
 (0.0043) (0.0142) (0.0024) 
TIER 1 -0.0002** 0.0002 -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
TIER 2 0.0661** -0.3751*** 0.0685*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0880) (0.0206) 
TLTA -0.0346*** -0.6470*** -0.0456*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0218) (0.0042) 
CTI -0.0361*** -0.0285** -0.0011 
 (0.0048) (0.0126) (0.0022) 
CRI -0.0479*** -0.0611*** 0.0039 
 (0.0043) (0.0132) (0.0030) 
DBI -0.0079** 0.0278*** -0.0075*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0092) (0.0021) 
ROA -1.3240*** -0.7937*** 0.0798 
 (0.1319) (0.2712) (0.0519) 
SIZE -0.0020*** -0.0078*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0003) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0019*** -0.0053*** 0.0017*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.1761*** 0.8633*** 0.0693*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0307) (0.0062) 
No. of observations 4,097 4,085 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:    
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 172.143 18.048 167.543 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.8036 0.5573 0.0513 
    
Fist Stage 
S1 0.6128
*** -0.0505*** 0.6037*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0152) (0.0392) 
S4 0.2683
*** -0.0383*** 0.2600*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0142) (0.0770) 
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Table 7 - Market discipline and enforcement actions  
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment 
effects model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory 
variables in the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each 
regression are noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop 
the observation at time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential 
confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we 
report coefficients and standard errors for the two instrumental variables. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or 
less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL1 
(2) 
RWA 
(3) 
TIER1 
(4) 
TIER2 
(5) 
TLTA PL1  TIE 1 TIE 2 TLT  
CRS 0.2631*** 0.0613*** -0.0161 0.0049** -0.0658*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0237) (0.0103) (0.0024) (0.0151) 
MKTDIS -0.3570*** 0.1125*** -0.0465*** 0.0185*** 0.1359*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0224) (0.0138) (0.0029) (0.0182) 
CRS*MKTDIS 0.7047*** 0.1633*** 0.0498* -0.0053 -0.0835*** 
 (0.1358) (0.0598) (0.0292) (0.0055) (0.0324) 
NPL1  -0.0525*** -0.0471*** 0.0020 0.0181* 
  (0.0125) (0.0082) (0.0013) (0.0098) 
RWA -0.2144***  -0.1481*** -0.0027 0.1736*** 
 (0.0411)  (0.0166) (0.0019) (0.0166) 
TIER 1 -0.0046*** -0.0029***  -0.0001** -0.0016*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0000) (0.0003) 
TIER 2 0.3879 -0.2474 -0.2355*  -0.5677*** 
 (0.2805) (0.1541) (0.1228)  (0.1264) 
TLTA 0.2233*** 0.3659*** -0.1760*** -0.0200***  
 (0.0544) (0.0264) (0.0235) (0.0033)  
CTI -0.3394*** -0.0019 0.0292* 0.0082*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0243) (0.0161) (0.0022) (0.0169) 
CRI -0.4324*** -0.2869*** 0.0509*** -0.0015 -0.1174*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0227) (0.0189) (0.0026) (0.0218) 
DBI -0.0221 0.0225 0.0379*** 0.0079*** -0.0143 
 (0.0372) (0.0203) (0.0124) (0.0021) (0.0154) 
ROA -12.1366*** -1.1027* -0.1594 -0.0598 -0.0739 
 (1.2538) (0.6649) (0.3306) (0.0498) (0.4223) 
SIZE -0.0079* -0.0234*** -0.0115*** 0.0033*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0018) 
Z-SCORE -0.0256*** 0.0420*** 0.0298*** -0.0009*** 0.0038* 
 (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Constant 1.1736*** 0.6563*** 0.5272*** -0.0186*** 0.4122*** 
 (0.0995) (0.0550) (0.0370) (0.0056) (0.0378) 
No. of observations 4,080 4,085 4,085 4,088 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:      
Underidentification (p-
value) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 175.487 167.681 167.394 167.917 168.280 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.4969 0.8894 0.6847 0.2039 0.5272 
      
First Stage 
S1 0.6211
*** 0.6022*** 0.6020*** 0.6102*** 0.6032*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0391) 
S4 0.2638
*** 0.2606*** 0.2605*** 0.2335*** 0.2610*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0767) (0.0766) (0.0759) (0.0767) 
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Table 8 - Market discipline and enforcement actions – further estimations 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at 
time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We 
would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard 
errors for the two instrumental variables. *** indicates a level of significance equal to 1 percent or less; ** between 1 
and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL2 
(2) 
BOND 
(3) 
LIQ 
CRS 0.0335 0.0846** -0.0090 
 (0.0209) (0.0418) (0.0101) 
MKTDIS -0.0357*** 0.0730*** -0.0086*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0124) (0.0027) 
CRS*MKTDIS 0.0011 -0.2934** 0.0297 
 (0.0671) (0.1321) (0.0310) 
NPL1  0.0223*** 0.0036** 
  (0.0059) (0.0018) 
RWA -0.0064 -0.0957*** -0.0024 
 (0.0043) (0.0102) (0.0024) 
TIER 1 -0.0002** 0.0002 -0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
TIER 2 0.0947*** -0.4139*** 0.0753*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0837) (0.0205) 
TLTA -0.0286*** -0.6752*** -0.0445*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0182) (0.0042) 
CTI -0.0387*** -0.0190* -0.0019 
 (0.0051) (0.0107) (0.0022) 
CRI -0.0512*** -0.0446*** 0.0029 
 (0.0044) (0.0129) (0.0030) 
DBI -0.0080** 0.0283*** -0.0076*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0087) (0.0021) 
ROA -1.3558*** -0.7195*** 0.0689 
 (0.1350) (0.2394) (0.0529) 
SIZE -0.0019*** -0.0080*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0003) 
Z-SCORE -0.0022*** -0.0039** 0.0017*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.1783*** 0.8482*** 0.0710*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0286) (0.0063) 
No. of observations 4,097 4,085 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:    
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 18.381 18.629 18.705 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.8745 0.1217 0.0714 
    
Fist Stage 
S1 0.1547
*** 0.1557*** 0.1561*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) 
S4 0.0916
*** 0.0919*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0466) (0.0466) 
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Table 9 - The effect of the credit risk enforcement actions a financial crisis 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at 
time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We 
would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard 
errors for the two instrumental variables. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * 
between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL1 
(2) 
RWA 
(3) 
TIER1 
(4) 
TIER2 
(5) 
TLTA PL1  TIE 1 TIE 2 TLT  
CRS 0.2604*** 0.0635*** -0.0173* 0.0054** -0.0644*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0235) (0.0102) (0.0024) (0.0153) 
CRISIS -0.0882*** 0.0075 0.0100* 0.0020** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0083) (0.0055) (0.0010) (0.0071) 
CRISIS * CRS 0.2097*** 0.0431* 0.0089 -0.0011 -0.0262** 
 (0.0461) (0.0224) (0.0079) (0.0020) (0.0110) 
NPL1  -0.0602*** -0.0438*** 0.0008 0.0091 
  (0.0124) (0.0081) (0.0013) (0.0098) 
RWA -0.2412***  -0.1517*** -0.0014 0.1891*** 
 (0.0418)  (0.0167) (0.0019) (0.0167) 
TIER 1 -0.0044*** -0.0031***  -0.0001** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0000) (0.0003) 
TIER 2 0.0944 -0.1675 -0.2740**  -0.4690*** 
 (0.2803) (0.1556) (0.1223)  (0.1254) 
TLTA 0.1622*** 0.3888*** -0.1847*** -0.0169***  
 (0.0540) (0.0261) (0.0232) (0.0032)  
CTI -0.3207*** -0.0132 0.0327** 0.0068*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0235) (0.0160) (0.0022) (0.0175) 
CRI -0.3967*** -0.3023*** 0.0569*** -0.0038 -0.1355*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0227) (0.0186) (0.0026) (0.0220) 
DBI -0.0238 0.0216 0.0380*** 0.0080*** -0.0147 
 (0.0373) (0.0203) (0.0123) (0.0021) (0.0155) 
ROA -12.0345*** -1.3382** -0.1157 -0.0854* -0.2600 
 (1.2282) (0.6446) (0.3283) (0.0506) (0.4330) 
SIZE -0.0087* -0.0233*** -0.0117*** 0.0033*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0018) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0235*** 0.0411*** 0.0304*** -0.0011*** 0.0026 
 (0.0062) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Constant 1.1587*** 0.6800*** 0.5240*** -0.0165*** 0.4387*** 
 (0.0990) (0.0542) (0.0369) (0.0056) (0.0382) 
No. of observations 4,080 4,085 4,085 4,088 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:      
Underidentification (p-
value) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 175.143 167.661 167.250 167.986 167.752 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.4650 0.8424 0.7209 0.2220 0.6014 
      
First Stage 
S1 0.6215
*** 0.6036*** 0.6032*** 0.6114*** 0.6039*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0392) 
S4 0.2632
*** 0.2604*** 0.2602*** 0.2335*** 0.2606*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0769) (0.0768) (0.0761) (0.0769) 
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Table 10 - The effect of the credit risk enforcement actions and financial crisis – further 
estimations 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables of 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at 
time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We 
would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard 
errors for the two instrumental variables. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * 
between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL2 
(2) 
BOND 
(3) 
LIQ   I  
CRS 0.0340*** 0.0073 -0.0010 
 (0.0048) (0.0072) (0.0025) 
CRISIS * CRS -0.0129*** -0.0123** 0.0022 
 (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0014) 
CRISIS 0.0242*** 0.0103 -0.0001 
 (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0024) 
NPL1  -0.0047 0.0042** 
  (0.0054) (0.0017) 
RWA -0.0113*** -0.0514*** -0.0030 
 (0.0042) (0.0095) (0.0024) 
TIER 1 -0.0002** -0.0000 -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
TIER 2 0.0666** -0.2158*** 0.0685*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0752) (0.0205) 
TLTA -0.0337*** -0.6634*** -0.0456*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0173) (0.0042) 
CTI -0.0351*** -0.0026 -0.0011 
 (0.0048) (0.0098) (0.0022) 
CRI -0.0484*** -0.0333*** 0.0039 
 (0.0043) (0.0124) (0.0030) 
DBI -0.0072* 0.0020 -0.0075*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0021) 
ROA -1.2790*** 0.3373 0.0796 
 (0.1314) (0.2228) (0.0521) 
SIZE -0.0020*** -0.0076*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0003) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0017*** -0.0001 0.0017*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.1746*** 0.8649*** 0.0693*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0267) (0.0062) 
No. of observations 4,097 4,085 4,085 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:    
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 172.049 167.325 167.325 
Overidentification (p-value) 0.8487 0.7476 0.0512 
    
Fist Stage 
S1 0.6127
*** 0.6033*** 0.6033*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0392) (0.0392) 
S4 0.2684
*** 0.2602*** 0.2602*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0769) (0.0769) 
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Table 11 - The effect of the credit risk enforcement actions on non-sanctioned banks  
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. All dependent variables are calculated as variations between periods t+1 
and t. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at time t+1 for each bank that 
received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the 
referees for giving us this suggestion. ***indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * 
between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL1 
(2) 
RWA 
(3) 
TIER1 
(4) 
TIER2 
(5) 
TLTA PL1  TIE 1 TIE 2 TLT  
MAHA -1.0552*** 0.2805** 0.2372*** -0.0037 0.2641*** 
 (0.1743) (0.1165) (0.0760) (0.0118) (0.0999) 
NPL1  -0.0483*** -0.0435*** 0.0000 0.0075 
  (0.0133) (0.0087) (0.0014) (0.0108) 
RWA -0.2338***  -0.1634*** -0.0027 0.1759*** 
 (0.0514)  (0.0183) (0.0023) (0.0208) 
TIER 1 -0.0051*** -0.0036***  -0.0001** -0.0024*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0004)  (0.0001) (0.0004) 
TIER 2 -0.1917 -0.1280 -0.2784**  -0.2724* 
 (0.3559) (0.1795) (0.1323)  (0.1449) 
TLTA 0.1810*** 0.3395*** -0.2107*** -0.0170***  
 (0.0628) (0.0295) (0.0264) (0.0038)  
CTI -0.2375*** -0.0837** -0.0016 0.0082*** 0.0018 
 (0.0599) (0.0330) (0.0228) (0.0031) (0.0287) 
CRI 0.1342 -0.4818*** -0.1216** -0.0032 -0.3225*** 
 (0.1193) (0.0755) (0.0489) (0.0078) (0.0628) 
DBI 0.2065*** -0.0626* -0.0053 0.0070** -0.0839*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0322) (0.0218) (0.0034) (0.0285) 
ROA -14.3248*** -2.0386*** 0.3198 -0.0950* 0.3207 
 (1.4352) (0.6598) (0.3526) (0.0560) (0.5309) 
SIZE -0.0066 -0.0270*** -0.0120*** 0.0036*** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0022) 
Z-SCORE -0.0381*** 0.0441*** 0.0296*** -0.0013*** 0.0055** 
 (0.0070) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0028) 
Constant 1.2059*** 0.7881*** 0.5604*** -0.0173** 0.4900*** 
 (0.1222) (0.0604) (0.0419) (0.0071) (0.0478) 
No. of observations 3,324 3,331 3,331 3,330 3,331 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:      
Underidentification (p-
value) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 88.697 87.366 88.111 85.238 87.298 
      
Fist Stage 
Maha (lag) 0.3470*** 0.3478*** 0.3458*** 0.3434*** 0.3461*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0372) (0.0368) (0.0372) (0.0370) 
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Table 12 - The effect of credit risk enforcement actions on non-sanctioned banks – further 
estimations 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the two-stage treatment effects 
model of equations (1) and (2). The sample period is 2005-2013. The first stage includes all explanatory variables in 
the second stage. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. The dependent variables in each regression are 
noted in the first line of the table below. All dependent variables are calculated as variations between periods t+1 
and t. We also drop the observation at time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to 
face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. 
Independent variables are lagged 1 period. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; 
* between 5 and 10 percent.  
 
Dependent Variables  
at time t+1 
(1) 
NPL2 
(2) 
BOND 
(3) 
LIQ   I  
MAHA -0.1528*** -0.2310*** -0.9156*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0597) (0.1468) 
NPL1  -0.0133**  
  (0.0060)  
RWA -0.0064 -0.0523*** -0.1874*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0109) (0.0452) 
TIER 1 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0046*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
TIER 2 0.0396 -0.2483*** -0.3578 
 (0.0396) (0.0822) (0.2991) 
TLTA -0.0304*** -0.6738*** 0.0546 
 (0.0073) (0.0202) (0.0547) 
CTI -0.0192*** 0.0173 -0.1538*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0144) (0.0478) 
CRI 0.0360** 0.1114*** 0.1534 
 (0.0148) (0.0379) (0.1029) 
DBI 0.0260*** 0.0494*** 0.1835*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0173) (0.0469) 
ROA -1.5909*** -0.0343 -10.7338*** 
 (0.1504) (0.2500) (1.1839) 
SIZE -0.0011* -0.0064*** -0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0050) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0036*** -0.0022 -0.0322*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0062) 
Constant 0.1647*** 0.8754*** 0.9303*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0295) (0.1032) 
No. of observations 3,337 3,331 3,355 
Firm bank specialization Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Tests:    
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification (F-stat) 88.840 86.551 85.379 
    
 Fist Stage   
Maha (lag) 0.3473*** 0.3439*** 0.3399*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0367) 
 
